


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11 March 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, ORE

SUBJECT: State Department's Participation in Intelligence Memoranda

REFERENCE: Memoranda of October 1948 re oral discussions  
Memo of January 7, 1949 to ORE from ICAPS  
Memo of February 8, 1949 to Director "Coordination of Intelligence"  
State's informal notes on February 1st ORE Status Report

*ORE's reply?*

1. With reference to the above memoranda and to many discussions on the above subject, which have been increasing in intensity and in frequency this calendar year, State tells us that they are still dissatisfied with the lack of coordination in Intelligence Memoranda on political subjects.

2. State does not request formal, lengthy, round-table meetings, especially on urgent matters, but would like to have ORE telephone about or in any convenient way keep OIR currently informed of the political subjects ORE is working on.

3. State too often receives only ex post facto information on these subjects and often receives no copy even after ORE's production is published. The Air Force and Army are in the same position, but fewer IM's have pertained to their fields of dominant interest.

4. State thinks that all of our production is National Intelligence and that it should be on our distribution list and should participate, to some extent at any rate, in political subjects.

5. At this time no more formal written protest has been lodged with us by State because this matter most probably will play a prominent part in State's reply to the NSC on the Dulles Report.

6. One of ORE's statements to OIR to the effect that CIA could not be bothered to follow the rules listed in NSCID #3 still rankles in State.

*Not done*


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7. If ORE would follow NSCID #3, a lot of interdepartmental friction would be eliminated. We cannot understand why it is so difficult for ORE to do this especially since NSCID #3 and the attendant DCI directives provide for urgent as well as ordinary matters.

*This has been explained again & again. To  
Childs and to Foster.*



PRESCOTT CHILDS  
Chief, ICAPS

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cc: Director  
Executive

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3 February 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: "Coordination of Intelligence"

1. With reference to the recurring statements throughout the Dulles Report that the IAC Agencies should more actively participate in CIA's production of intelligence estimates, we think that complaints by State are justified that it is not being consulted in the production of Intelligence Memoranda, when the subject is obviously within the field of State's dominant interest. Furthermore, the Air Force received no prior notification on two recent papers produced in ORE - "Reinforcing the Israeli Air Force," and "Uncontrolled International Air Traffic". Obviously these were both within the field of dominant interest of the Air Force.

2. NSCID No. 3 paragraph 1c (5) states that CIA and the Agencies shall for purposes of coordination, exchange information on projects and plans for the production of staff intelligence, and paragraph 1e (4) states that the DCI shall request and receive such special estimates, etc., etc. prepared by the individual departments in their fields of dominant interest, etc., etc.

3. In October we discussed this with Messrs. Babbitt and  when State first brought up the subject of not participating, and of not being consulted orally when the subject of the IM was obviously within their field of dominant interest. (See October memoranda). Again State brought up this complaint at the end of December, so we again, in a memo of January 7 referred this matter to Mr. Babbitt. All State wants is to be consulted orally or advised of the subject under consideration. We think it would be no hardship, and not at all difficult for ORE to advise State, or Air, or any IAC member of the subject under consideration, even if it is so urgent that there is not time for actual participation by the IAC Agency. DCI 3/1 covers the way this should be done under normal procedures, under urgent procedures, and under exceptional circumstances. We think ORE should follow these instructions.

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4. State says that it very recently began to receive mimeographed slips about the subject that is to be considered, but that these slips usually reach it after the dead-line specified therein. It would be better pleased if it could be given prompt oral information on the subject — to avoid future confusion like the recent case of Manganese (?).

5. ORE claims that State never meets its dead-lines, but we think

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that should not be used as an excuse for CIA not doing its part in accordance with the established regulations. Furthermore, we wonder if 100% of the IM's are so urgent that the subject matter cannot be at least orally given to State before production is completed.

6. We also think that the "Review of the World Situation" which is now published regularly for the National Security Council would carry a lot more weight and be more in accordance with the laws and regulations if it were coordinated at least orally in advance of publication. Formerly, there was an irregular dead-line making such a procedure too difficult, but now that it has a fixed date of publication each month, we should think that the IAC members could participate in this publication also.

7. The feeling that CIA has a free hand in current and staff intelligence, we think has gone too far, because the basic law and regulation under which we function give to CIA the responsibility for only national intelligence, and the method for setting up national intelligence is participation by the various established intelligence agencies in the National Military Establishment and State. We think that CIA should stick to the rules of the game and not by-pass them. Then after we have no mote in our own eye, we can with justification get after the beam in the other fellow's.

PRESIDENT CHILDS  
Chief, ICAPS

1. Director said he would instruct ORE to do more IAC coordinating.
2. N.B. - An ORE worker actually told OIR that ORE couldn't be bothered to follow the rules in NSCID 3 et al.
3. Feb. 11<sup>th</sup> - Booth said he noticed change in ORE attitude that Am.
4. Booth + Armstrong know subject of this Memo.
5. Sumner of State says IM Coordination is "worse than ever", Mar 2<sup>nd</sup>! *PZ*

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